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ABSTRAK
Penawaran saham perdana (Initial public offering = IPO) menjadi topik penelitian yang menarik untuk dikaji
mengingat isu ketimpangan informasi atau asimetri informasi di antara pihak-pihak yang terlibat di dalamnya.
Salah satu fenomena yang menarik untuk dikaji dan melekat dengan penawaran saham perdana adalah adanya
dugaan praktik manajemen laba (Teoh et al., 1998). Dalam hal ini, ada dorongan yang kuat bagi pemilik lama
perusahaan untuk membuat kinerja keuangan perusahaan lebih baik pada periode sebelum panawaran.
Penelitian ini mencoba untuk menguji apakah ada kenaikan laba yang signifikan pada periode sebelum
penawaran yang dapat diinterpretasikan sebagai adanya manajemen laba. Perilaku aliran kas dari aktivitas
operasi juga diteliti. Sampel penelitian mencakup 35 perusahaan yang melakukan penawaran saham perdana di
Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2002-2005. Uji-t untuk perbedaan nilai diterapkan untuk menguji apakah laba
antar periode berbeda. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa besaran laba cenderung meningkat pada tahun
mendekati saat penawaran saham, tetapi menurun pada periode dua tahun setelah penawaran saham perdana.
Perilaku aliran kas dari aktivitas operasi relatif sama dengan perilaku laba. Namun demikian, penelitian ini
tidak sampai pada kesimpulan bahwa manajemen laba terbukti dengan nyata dilakukan pada perusahaan yang
melakukan IPO di Indonesia tahun 2002-2005.
Kata kunci: IPOs, prospektus, laba, aliran kas dari aktivitas operasi
ABSTRACT
Initial public offerings (IPOs) offer a fruitful area to be explored given the existence of asymmetric
information among various parties interested in the IPO.  One of the issues pertaining in the IPO
setting is the presumed existence of earnings management practice (Teoh et al., 1998). In this case,
there seems to be strong incentives of the owners of the firm to make financial performance of the firm
look better in the periods before the offering. This study attempts to examine whether there is
significant increase in earnings level prior to the offering to be interpreted as the existence of earnings
management. The behaviour of cash flow from operation is also examined. A sample of 35 Indonesian
IPOs that made public during 2002-2005 periods was examined. The t-test for mean difference was
performed to test whether earnings is different. The findings show that earnings level tends to
increase in the year closes to the IPO date, but decrease in the next two years after that. The behaviour
of cash flows from operating activities is almost similar. However, this study is unable to state that
earnings management is strongly evidenced in Indonesian IPO settings.
Keywords: IPOs, prospectus, earnings, cash flows from operations
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INTRODUCTION
Going public through selling equity
securities to the public for the first time,
known as an initial public offering (IPO), is
considered an important method for private
companies to raise capital. One aspect of
IPOs that is of interest is that the offering
prices have to be set without the benefit of
an observable market price. In this case, the
issuers and underwriters must set the
offering price using non-price information
since there are no adequate and reliable
market price determinants for IPOs until
trading of the securities begins. This makes
the setting of the offering price difficult and
critical because it will affect either the
response of the market or the issuers’
wealth (Ibbotson et al., 1988, 1994). Thus,
uncertainty concerning the true value of
IPO stocks is greater than that pertaining to
already traded ones and prospective inves-
tors should seek for various measures in
valuing the IPO before making any invest-
ment decision on the offered stocks.
One potential source of information
relevant to pricing an IPO is accounting
information. Some scholars believe that
accounting information plays an important
role in determining the price of an IPO
given only limited, if any, information
available about the issuing firm prior to the
listing date.
It is not uncommon that prior to the
offering a company, as a privately held
corporation, has less or even no obligation
to reveal its information to the public. The
literature has also recommended the in-
corporation of accounting numbers in deter-
mining at what price the stock of an IPO
should be sold (Perez, 1984; Bloch, 1986;
Sutton and Benedetto, 1988; Buck, 1990). In
addition, accounting numbers have been
used as a standard practice in many IPO
valuation case studies (Varaiya et al., 1997).
Rosenberg and Marathe (1979), cited in
Downes and Heinkel (1982), suggest that
the characteristics of a firm’s risk and return
are affected by its attributes, which could be
in term of indices (e.g., firm’s industry
group and size) or signals (e.g., the level of
share ownership and the auditing firms).
These attributes can be used to predict the
risk and value of a firm’s equity. As accoun-
ting information represents one of the
attributes, it can also be of potential use as a
predictor of risk and value and serve to
reduce the uncertainty of a firm’s security.
Numerous papers have provided
analytical and empirical evidence of the
association between accounting numbers
and the value of IPOs (Downes and
Heinkel, 1982; Hughes, 1986; Titman and
Trueman, 1986; Krinsky and Rotenberg,
1989a, 1989b; Kim et al., 1993, 1994, 1995 and
Klein, 1996). In particular, Kim et al. (1995)
and Klein (1996) show that information in
the prospectus is value relevant concerning
the IPO. In other words, the value of IPOs is
also related to the signals taken by the
entrepreneurs, such as the level of owner-
ship retention or the quality of underwriters
and auditors. These suggest that, apart from
the uncertainty surrounding the IPO, the
value of an IPO is somewhat predictable.
The literature, theoretical and empirical
evidence, has indicated that certain accoun-
ting measures can be used as proxies for
total firm risk, that is, they could determine
the riskiness of a corporation (Lev, 1974;
Bowman, 1979; DeAngelo, 1990). The
accounting and financial textbooks also
suggest that accounting information is
relevant in determining the value and thus
the riskiness of a corporation through the
use of accounting analysis (Brealy and
Myers, 1996; Benninga and Sarig, 1997;
White et al., 1998).
One may argue that since most of the
information available in the prospectus is
accounting information, it is arguable that
this information represents a potential
source for assessing the issuing firm. Some
scholars have also advocated the possibility
of using accounting information in assessing
the value of firm making an IPO (Beaver et
al., 1970; Foster, 1986; Lev, 1989; Berstein
and Wild, 2000; Noland and Pelvik, 1998).
In addtion, Ryan (1997), based on his survey
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relating accounting numbers and company
risk, notes the possibility of incorporating
accounting information for measuring the
risk of a firm making an IPO in the absence
of ex-post risk measures prior to the
offering.
Boulton et al. (2011) assert that a num-
ber of researchers have studied the link
between accounting information disclosed
in the IPO prospectus and the market value
of going-public firms. Principally, this strain
of the literature asks whether the IPO firms
manipulating their financial statements to
obtain a higher share price so as to improve
the initial owners’ private wealth. Using a
sample of 10,783 IPOs from 37 countries,
Boulton et al. found that IPOs were under-
priced less in countries where public firms
produced higher quality earnings informa-
tion. This finding suggests that earnings
quality will affect the riskiness of an IPO.
To summarize, the literature and empi-
rical evidence have suggested that accoun-
ting information is very useful for predic-
ting the value of an IPO. Not surprisingly
that may studies are directed to examine
whether issuers of IPO deliberately use
accounting discretion to affect accounting
number in order to be successfully selling
the stocks. This motivation has led to what
so called earnings management practices in
IPO setting.
This study examines earnings manage-
ment of Indonesian IPOs. Companies
offering shares publicly for listing in the
capital market are required by the securities
law to meet certain financial and operating
criterias. Because of the major impact of the
offering prices on their private wealth and
the explicit use of accounting numbers,
particularly accounting earnings, the mana-
gers and the major stockholders of IPO
firms, called the issuers, have incentives to
manage earnings numbers as an effort to
maximize their private wealth through the
offering price.
Scott (2003) defines earnings manage-
ment as the choices by a manager of
accounting policies to achieve some specific
objectives. Scott pointed out that manager
can choose accounting policies from a set of
policies (GAAP). Accordingly, it is natural
to expect that they will choose policies so as
to maximize their own utility and/or the
market value of the firm. While this define-
tion is much broader than the one used by
the SEC, it is useful for us to recognize that
it is managers acting in their own self-
interest that explains their behaviour. Put it
simple, Scott (2003) expresses earnings
management as any action performed by
management to select accounting policy to
affect reported accounting profits with the
purpose of obtaining higher wealth and/or
market value of the firm.
In similar spirit, Healy and Wahlen
(1999:368) suggest that earnings manage-
ment occurs:
"When managers use judgment in financial
reporting and in structuring transactions
to alter financial reports to either mislead
some stakeholders about the underlying
economic performance of the company or to
influence contractual outcomes that depend
on reported accounting numbers”.
We interpret this broad definition as
including earnings management in IPO.
Dechow and Skinner (2000) also mentions
that IPO setting provides incentive for
manager to manage reported earnings.
Levitt (1998), former chairman of United
States’ capital market regulator, has asserted
that aggressive earnings management has
been of concern to regulators for several
years and that concern has only intensified
following evidences of improper accounting
practices by Enron, World Com, and some
other major corporations.
A number of studies using Indonesian
IPOs have been conducted, but the results
are still mixed. For example, Gumanti (1996)
does not find evidence of earnings mana-
gement in IPO for firms that went public
between July 1991 and December 1994.
Gumanti (2003) also does not find evidence
that manufacturing firm making IPO
manage earnings prior to the IPO date.
Warganegara and Indriastari (2009) do not
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find evidence of income increasing for firm
making IPO from 2005 to 2006. However,
Gumanti (2001) also finds support that
issuers of IPO manage accrual in the period
prior to go public for a sample of 39 IPOs
between 1995 and 1997. These studies use
accruals base model to predict whether
earnings before IPO date are managed.
Gumanti and Swastika (2005) examine
the behaviour of IPO’s performance in the
periods before and after the offering. They
compare a number of key operating perfor-
mance measures of the firm and find a
tendency that the operating performance
IPO firms tends to decrease after the IPO
year indicating an effort to boost reported
earnings prior to the offering. Hastoro and
Yuliana (2010) examine 32 firms making
IPO at the Indonesian Stock Exchange bet-
ween 2000 and 2008 and showed that
discretionary accruals one year prior to IPO
date are positive but it becomes negative
after the IPO. This indicates that prior to
IPO date, issuers have strong intention to
boost earnings but they are unable to
maintain the level of earnings after the IPO
date. One may argue that earnings tend to
be managed upward in the period prior to
offering and managed downward in the
period after the offering.
It can be seen that issuers of IPO firms
in Indonesia Stock Exchange have strong
intention of managing earnings perfor-
mance. Earnings are tending to increase in
the periods prior to the offering and conver-
sely earnings are tending to decrease in the
periods after the offering. This evidence
suggests that earnings management is
common practice in Indonesia IPO setting.
The question is that whether this incidence
is continuing? One may argue that such
efforts may occur in certain situation but not
in other situation. In particular, issuers’
incentive to increase earnings performance
is driven by their expectation to generate
more cash from the issue. Nagata and
Hachiya (2003) find offer price reflects
earnings management to some extent. More
specifically, firms with conservative ear-
nings management tend to have higher offer
prices and firms managing earnings aggres-
sively tend to be discounted when they fail
to exhibit smooth earnings growth.
Unlike already listed firms, there are
fairly limited sources of information on
firms before going public. This has made
interested parties in IPO setting, such as
outsiders including underwriters and inves-
tors have to rely on financial statement
information until the trading of shares in the
capital market starts. Some scholars have
suggested the use of accounting information
in conjunction with comparable firm multi-
ples in valuing IPOs (Titman and Trueman,
1986; DeAngelo, 1986; Kim and Ritter, 1999).
Evidence has clearly indicated that under-
writers use accounting variables to set an
offer price with few other sources of infor-
mation creates a strong incentive for IPO
issuers to boost reported earnings through
discretionary accounting choices. Thus, ear-
nings management seems to be a common
practice in an IPO setting.
It has been widely believed that before
the year of IPO, a great proportion of com-
panies demonstrate a bright performance
but declined substantially right after the
stock offerings, suggesting the existence of
earnings management by the IPO firms. The
phenomenon is particularly severe for
accounting earnings. As a result, accusation
that IPO firms manage earnings to inflate
offering prices arises and results in wide-
spread public outcry and demands for stock
market governing body actions. In light
with this accusation, this study investigates
whether IPO firms manage earnings in an
attempt to improve the success of offering.
Employing 35 firms making IPO at the
Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2002 to
2005, this study is unable to conclude that
earnings management is evidence for pe-
riods before the offering. The remainder of
this paper is organized as follows. Section
two presents review of related literature.
Section three describes sample selection and
variable measurement. This is followed by
findings and discussion. Final section
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summarises and provides genesis for future
study.
THEORETICAL REVIEW
There are various definitions of ear-
nings management exhibited in the account-
ting literature. Rosner (2003) defines ear-
nings management as techniques that mana-
gers deliberately employ to achieve a
desired level of reported earnings. In parti-
cular, Rosner advocates between earnings
management and fraudulent financial re-
porting or fraud by the kinds of techniques
used to manipulate earnings, or the inten-
sity with which they are employed. Dechow
and Skinner (2000) also differentiates bet-
ween earnings management and accounting
fraud. Fraudulent accounting does involve
violation of Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) while earnings manage-
ment does not. On the other hand, Giroux
(2004) defines earnings management as the
whole spectrum of conservative accounting,
moderate accounting, aggressive accounting
and fraud.
Studying IPO is interesting because
there so many aspects that we can explore.
For example, the IPO structure is unique for
studying environments that may be inclined
to incentives to manage earnings. It has
been argued that companies going public
have an acute need to meet quarterly ear-
nings forecasts. This condition may increase
pressures to take questionable actions. That
is, these actions may become more and
more aggressive and lean toward fraud. In
addition, these pressures to manage ear-
nings may also be motivated by compen-
sation packages that involve stock options,
which typically increase in value as indi-
cated by positive financial and operational
results. In other words, earnings manage-
ment could easily be found in an IPO setting
that will lead to fraud if the action is
considered to be deliberate.
In line with the case of earnings mana-
gement in IPO setting, Shawver and
Shawver (2009) document very surprising
evidence that more people with an account-
ting, auditing or finance background are
added to the board of directors, there is an
increased likelihood of fraud. This is indi-
cated by the fact of positive relationship
between board directors with accounting
background and the level of fraud. They
interpret this finding as consistent with the
belief that management’s actions may be-
come more aggressive and lean toward
fraud as those working on an IPO respond
to internal pressure, external pressure and
the incentives of earnings management.
This finding may also be assumed that the
financial experts for IPO companies may
have bowed to pressures of rising stock
prices, thus leading them to make up the
accounting performance of the firm.
Issuers or initial owners of the firm
have incentives to make choices that maxi-
mize their offering price in the case where
firm is being sold, private as well as public
targets (targeted interested participants).
Thus, firms could manage earnings up-
wards if management expects price to be a
positive function of earnings, the case which
is suitable in IPO setting. Consequently, we
might argue that reported earnings are
likely to be a noisier and more positively
biased measure of permanent earnings. This
situation will make lower earnings quality
prior to the sale transaction.
Hoping that earnings could be the
target for manipulative action in the case of
large equity transaction, some researchers
have examined this possibility. However,
the findings are mixed. Managers do not
manage earnings downward in the case of
management buyouts (DeAngelo, 1986). On
the other hand, earnings manipulation is
evident in the year preceding a mana-
gement buyout announcement, in which
managers reduce rather than inflate ear-
nings prior to the transaction (Perry and
Williams, 1994).
However, for equity offerings, i.e., IPO,
the results from various empirical studies
are also inconsistent. For example, Teoh et
al. (1998) report strong evidence for income-
increasing management in IPO firms. Yet,
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Ball and Shivakumar (2008) do not find
evidence of earnings management around
IPOs. These two studies examine IPO firms
in the United States. Ball and Shivakumar
argue that their findings are due to the
higher quality reporting demanded of pu-
blic firms by financial statement users and
consequentially higher monitoring by audi-
tors, boards, analysts, rating agencies, press,
and litigants, and to greater regulatory
scrutiny. Similar to Ball and Shivakumar,
Roosenboom et al. (2003) find that earnings
management is not evident among IPO
firms at the Netherlands.
The question now is that, how could
prospective investor intelligently justify the
IPO? What information do they need? The
prospectus of the offering firm may provide
the answer of these questions.
Prior to be able to make IPO, a pro-
posing firm is required to provide pro-
spectus. Prospectus contains various infor-
mation, in particular accounting informa-
tion, that include a brief history of the firm’s
business, information related to past finan-
cial performance, ownership details, and the
risks associated with the investment. The
literature suggests that most prospective
and regular investors recognize that pro-
spectus provides the most detailed and
precise information about the issuing firm.
Despite the belief that prospectus as the
most reliable source of information, the
prospectus is a legal document that protects
the issuer and the underwriter because it is
written proof that the investor was provi-
ded with all the material facts related to the
offering. Given most of issuing firma are
known as private firms, very little is known
about how useful prospectus information is
to prospective investors in their decision to
invest in an issuing firm.
As a result of lack of history of past
revenues or earnings on the issuing firm,
investors are likely to be quite sceptical
about the value of information available in
the prospectus. This situation provides in-
centives for issuers to mislead accounting
information for their benefits. Previous
study shows that earnings management
prior to going public is related to long-run
underperformance which could further
erode the investor’s confidence in the value
of the information contained in the pro-
spectus, because it shows that firms could
resort to window dressing prior to going
public (Teoh et al., 1998). Yet, we might
agree to contend that information contained
in a prospectus is often the first window to a
potential investor about the firm’s past and
its projected future performance.  Teoh et al.
(1998:1936) assert by stating that:
”Issuers can report unusually high
earnings by adopting discretionary
accounting accrual adjustments that raise
reported earnings relative to actual cash
flows. If buyers are guided by earnings but
unaware that earnings are inflated by
generous use of accruals, they could pay too
high a price”.
We might agree to state that the valua-
tion of IPO and the setting of IPO offer
prices represent a challenging crossroads
between valuation theory and practice.
Theory dictates the use of discounted cash
flow as the conceptual foundation of valua-
tion. Unluckily, estimates of future cash
flows and discount rates for IPOs are diffi-
cult and tend to be imprecise. Kim and
Ritter (1999) provide evidence in this res-
pect.  This happens because there is limited
if not very rare information about the
offering firm prior to the publication of the
prospectus, a document mandated to be
part of the IPO process. Consequently,
prospective investors must use any avai-
lable information to judge whether it is
worth to buy the new shares of the issuing
firm or select other alternatives for invest-
ment. Investors with good information
collection effort may have better infor-
mation than others making her better infor-
med and the judgment to buy the shares is
well prepared.
Prospectus of the issuing firm is belie-
ved to be the most reliable information
about the firm. It contains information
about the firm but mostly the information
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related with financial performance, such as
summary of firm financial performance and
financial reports of at least three years prior
to the offering date. Prospectus becomes
prominent source of information so inves-
tors would carefully examine it to finally
judge whether the firm is a good investment
or not.
In addition, it seems that stereotypical
industry practice emphasizes the use of
accounting numbers as cash flow surrogates
and comparable firm multiples such as P/E
ratios as proxies for discount factors. In
other words, apart from examining the issu-
ing firm’s prospectus, including the portrait
of financial performance over the most
recent years, investor must also look at
other firm in the same industry to make
comparison. This comparison would give
him better outlook about the performance of
the issuing firm and its competitors.
Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest
that accounting performances, in particular
accounting numbers, are used by under-
writers and market participants in deter-
mining the offering price, meaning that they
are incorporated as additional information
into the valuation equation (Bloch, 1986;
Buck, 1990).  This is reasonable to argue that
underwriter would use accounting multiple
to gain quick picture of the benchmark of
firm performance prior to determining the
offering price. Thus, the question raised
within the IPO literature is how much varia-
tion in IPO prices remains to be explained
by factors other than accounting numbers
and comparable firm multiples. Empirical
evidence seems to conflict this assertion.
Kim and Ritter (1999) suggest that IPO
pricing is largely unrelated to historical
accounting information. One possible inter-
pretttation of Kim and Ritter’s finding is
that underwriters and investors build their
cash flow and discount rate estimates with
vastly different information.
Theoretically and as has been widely
accepted, cash flows are impossible to mani-
pulate through accounting choices. Given
that earnings management can be achieved
through accrual items, the difference bet-
ween earnings and cash flows can be used
as the basis of inference for the behaviour of
earnings. In other words, we may have been
able to detect earnings management possibi-
lity by combining the examination of ear-
nings and cash flows from operation beha-
viour.
Empirical evidence seems to indicate
that the evidence is identified in certain eco-
nomic settings, but not in others, and even
conflicting results occur in studies using
similar context, which indicate that the
motive and incentive for earnings manage-
ment among preparers of financial reports
are different. Dechow and Skinner (2000)
assert that share offerings in an IPO provide
direct incentive for managing earnings. In
the same spirit, Healy and Wahlen (1999)
contend that the capital market provides
specific incentive for earnings management
and in particular in the case of an IPO in
which managers “overstate” reported ear-
nings in the periods prior to equity offers.
As we believe that information contai-
ned in a prospectus is valuable in assessing
the risk of the offering, there are few studies
have been directed to explore the usefulness
of the information contained in the pro-
spectus including in relation to the sub-
sequent performance of the issuer. Hensler
et al. (1997) and Jain and Kini (2000) exa-
mine the survival of IPOs in the aftermarket
using some information from the offering
prospectus. Hensler et al. (1997) report some
variables, namely the issuer’s size, age at the
time of the IPO, level of underpricing, in-
sider ownership, industry membership, and
the level of IPO activity in the market are
significantly positively related to the proba-
bility of survival whereas the number of risk
factors listed in the offering prospectus is
significantly negatively related to the like-
lihood of survival. In similar spirit, Jain and
Kini (2000) demonstrate that venture capita-
list backed IPOs are more likely to survive
compared to others because they attract
prestigious investment bankers, influence
managers in strategic resource allocation
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decisions, influence institutional investors,
and help attract analyst following of the
firm sooner.
Another study by Platt (1995) also uses
prospectus data to predict the survival of an
IPO firm beyond the first three years of its
public life and finds that predicting bank-
ruptcies is difficult at best. Platt finds that
only 31% of bankrupt IPOs are correctly
classified, whereas the corresponding rate
for surviving IPOs is more than 90%.
Nevertheless, one may contend about the
robustness of Platt’s study as it is based on a
small sample of 32 bankrupt and 76 survi-
ving IPOs. These studies provide the first
evidence that information contained in the
prospectus can be gainfully employed to
assess the risk of an individual IPO.
Another study shows relationship bet-
ween earnings management and the offe-
ring price of the IPO. Nagata and Hachiya
(2007) study a sample of 581 IPO firms
listed at Japanese Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotation (JASDAQ)
between April 1989 and March 2000. They
find that firms with conservative earnings
management tend to have higher offer pri-
ces, and firms managing earnings aggres-
sively tend to be discounted when they fail
to exhibit smooth earnings growth. This
evidence indicate that firms making IPO has
strong tendency of successfully selling it
shares and thus it has to demonstrate that
the firm’s financial performance is good and
attractive.
Another interesting issue in the litera-
ture is the examination of the long-run
underperformance of IPOs. In the long run,
IPO firms tend to underperform compared
to their counterparts. Researchers try to
examine whether there is relationship bet-
ween poor long run return and other inter-
nal factors of the firm. Two notable studies,
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter
(1995), show that IPOs significantly under-
perform their matched-firm benchmarks in
the five years after their offering. This
typical issue has been examined in various
capital markets, such as in Latin America
(Aggarwal et al., 1993), the United Kingdom
(Espenlaub et al., 2000), Germany (Stehle et
al., 2000), South Africa (Page and Reyneke,
1997), Japan (Hwang and Jayaraman, 1995),
Singapore (Lee et al., 1996), Korea (Kim et
al., 1994), China (Mok and Hui, 1998), and
Malaysia (Paudyal et al., 1998).
Some studies have also examined the
factors affecting long-run underperfor-
mance of IPOs that Brav and Gompers
(1997) shown that underperformance is
concentrated in small non-venture capital-
backed IPOs, and Teoh et al. (1998) attribute
the long-run underperformance to earnings
management prior to the IPO. Houge et al.
(2001) find that IPOs with greater uncer-
tainty exhibit poor stock return performance
in the long run. Klein (1996) reports ear-
nings management through accruals in the
periods before the offering on United States
IPOs. That is, IPO firms tend to use income
increasing discretionary accruals in the
periods prior to the offering.
Nevertheless, evidence in other coun-
tries seems to be conflicting. For example,
Farooq and Benali (2012) report strong evi-
dence of earnings management on the year
of IPO in Casablanca Stock Exchange of
Morocco during 2001-2007. However,
Kamel (2012) in his study of 59 IPOs in
Egypt does not find that firm tend to over-
state their earnings before the IPO date.
Similar to Kamel (2012), Roosenboom et al.
(2003) do not report that earnings manage-
ment is evident among IPO firms at the
Netherlands. Thus, evidence of earnings
management in IPO setting is still incon-
clusive making it worth to re-examine the
phenomenon using other IPO setting.
Gumanti (2003) examine the incidence
of earnings management of IPO firms in
manufacturing industry that went public
over the period of 1991-1994 at the Jakarta
Stock exchange. Using the total accrual
approach that is similar to the one deve-
loped by Friedland (1994), Gumanti study
finds that the issuers of Indonesian IPOs do
not make income increasing discretionary
accruals in the periods prior to the offering.
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The positive changes in earnings in these
periods do not contribute to positive dis-
cretionary accruals. The second test exami-
ning the behavior of discretionary accruals
in the year after the offering, that is the first
year as a public firm, shows evidence of
earnings management. However, Rahman
and Hutagaol (2007) find evidence that
manager manage earnings through accruals
in the periods before the offering on a
sample of 149 IPOs that went public during
1994-2003. This conflicting result demands
further examination whether earnings
management in Indonesia IPO setting is per
vasive.
Previous studies largely use accruals
approach in testing earnings management
in IPO setting either using a simple accruals
model developed by Healy (1985),
DeAngelo (1986), Friedland (1994) and Jones
(1991) in modified Jones model including
the industrial adjusted model. In this study
a difference approach is used, that is an
earnings benchmark model. The spirit in
doing this study comes from Holland and
Ramsay (2003) who examine whether
Australian firms manage earnings to meet
earnings benchmark. They assert that
Australian companies manage earnings to
ensure reporting of positive profits and to
sustain the previous year’s profit perfor-
mance.
Based on the aforementioned review,
we assert that issuers of IPO have strong
incentive to inflate reported earnings in the
periods before the offering. In particular, the
intention is getting higher in the year
approaching the offering. We cannot predict
precisely the behaviour of earnings in the
periods after the offerings, but given that
earnings cannot be managed continuously,
we argue that earnings level tend to be
easing following the offering. This argu-
ment brings us to hypothesize that:
H1: Earnings level tend to increase in the
periods before the offering of new
stocks.
RESEARCH METHOD
The sample in this study includes 35
firms making IPO at the Indonesian Stock
Exchange during 2001-2005 periods. All the
firms have December 31 as their fiscal year
end. Financial statement data for these firms
include three years before and two years
after the IPO year. Note that the complete
financial report in terms of the latest year
available in the prospectus is treated as the
year zero and consequently be used as the
benchmark.
This study examines the behaviour of
two mostly target variables in assessing the
performance of IPO, namely the level of
earnings and cash flow from operating acti-
vities. These two variables and their deri-
vative have been used and extensively
examined in previous studies examining
earnings management of earnings mani-
pulation of the firms, in various economic
setting not limited to IPO per se. Holland
and Ramsay (2003) use the level and change
of earnings and cash flow from operation to
detect whether firms manage earnings to
meet simple earnings benchmark.
In line with Holland and Ramsay
(2003), this study also examines the beha-
viour of earnings and cash flow from ope-
ration in the periods before and after the
IPO year. The comparison of the level of
earnings and cash flow follows Jain and
Kini (1994) who use the latest year of IPO
complete financial year as the benchmark in
examining the performance of IPO firms.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A sample of 35 IPO firms meets the
selection criterias. Of the 35 sample firms, 14
firms went public in 2002, three were in
2003, ten firms went public in 2004, and
eight firms made an IPO in 2005. Two firms
are from agriculture sector, four are from
basic industry and chemical, 13 are from
finance sector, six firms are from trade and
services sector, followed by utility which is
represented by four firms. Three firms are
from miscellaneous industry, two are from
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mining sector and only one is from real
estate.
Table 1 presents the descriptive
statistics for net income after tax scaled by
total assets of the same period.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Net Income after Tax
NIST+2 NIST+1 NIST-0 NIST-1 NIST-2
Mean 0.0487 0.0521 0.0553 0.0365 0.0288
Median 0.0439 0.0410 0.0508 0.0377 0.0216
Standard Deviation 0.0734 0.0458 0.0699 0.0613 0.0834
Sample Variance 0.0054 0.0021 0.0049 0.0037 0.0069
Minimum -0.1528 -0.0239 -0.1683 -0.1842 -0.2839
Maximum 0.2918 0.1888 0.1948 0.1502 0.1744
Source: Authors calculations
Mean while, NIST stands for net
income after tax scaled by total assets of the
corresponding period. NIST+2 means that
earnings after tax in the year two after the
issue. The average net incomes tend to
increase in the year just before the offering
and decrease in the following two years
after the issue. The figures are almost simi-
lar with the median. The findings shown
here seem to indicate that earnings tend to
increase and then decrease. The behaviour
of net income after tax prior and after the
IPO is different compared to cash flow from
operating activities (See Table 2).
As shown in Table 2, cash flow from
operating activities scaled by total assets in
the corresponding period show an increase
only in the first two years before the issue,
but decline in the following two years. This
is similar to previous evidence as Hastoro
and Yuliana (2010) find positive discretio-
nary accruals in the year before the offering
and negative discretionary accruals in the
year after the offering. Interestingly, the
figures are negative indicating that after the
issue and on the last year prior to the issue,
management of IPO on average are unable
to maintain their ability to generate income
from operating activities. It should be noted
here that over the five year period, there
was always firms recording negative cash
flow from operating activities. As a question
to rise as that whether firms manage ear-
nings that lead to negative effect on cash
flow.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Cash Flow from Operating Activities
CFT-0 CFT-1 CFT-2 CFT-3 CFT-4
Mean -0.0163 -0.0631 -0.0031 0.0428 0.0257
Median 0.0176 -0.0205 0.0204 0.0681 0.0476
Standard Deviation 0.2701 0.2131 0.1489 0.2379 0.2132
Sample Variance 0.0729 0.0454 0.0222 0.0566 0.0454
Minimum -1.3544 -0.7729 -0.4278 -0.7023 -0.8137
Maximum 0.3218 0.1959 0.2445 0.4689 0.3518
Source: Authors calculations
Theoretically, cash flows are impossible
to manipulate through accounting choices.
Given that earnings management can be
achieved through accrual items, the
difference between earnings and cash flows
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can be an inference basis for the behaviour
of earnings management.
However, earnings are about ten times
cash flows just before IPO and the diffe-
rence between the two widen after IPO. This
pattern of the difference suggests two types
of earnings management “real earnings
management” and pure accounting mani-
pulations. Following Schipper (1985), real
earnings management means that firms
improve earnings performance by operating
activities not by accounting manipulations.
The time-series pattern of the difference
reveals some implications for earnings
management. Firstly, firms engage in real
earnings management before IPO as
evidenced by the time-series pattern of cash
flows. Secondly, the evidence that earnings
are much higher than cash flows for the pre-
IPO period suggests that the IPO firms also
engage in accounting type of earnings
management. Lastly, the convergence of
earnings to cash flows after IPO suggests
that companies refrain from earnings mana-
gement after IPO either because of the lack
of incentive for accounting type of earnings
management after IPO or the exhaustion of
discretionary accruals. We may all agree
that due to accounting equation, an income-
increasing earnings management will lead
to an income-decreasing accrual in the
future.
This is consistent with the general per-
ception that managers tend to manage
earnings to maintain a “honey moon
period” for the stock price after IPO. Using
United States’s IPO setting, Teoh et al. (1998)
argue that the incentives to manage ear-
nings are likely to persist in the months
immediately after the offering. In this case,
managers usually cannot dispose of their
personal holdings until several months after
the IPO. Besides, firms face unusual legal
and possible reputational scrutiny in the
IPO. Immediate accounting reversals may
render earnings management activities
transparent enough to trigger law suits
against the firms and its managers. In short,
the pattern of average earnings and cash
flows provides affirmative evidence for the
existence of earnings management inclu-
ding real earnings management and the
pure accounting manipulations.
Next tests were conducted to examine
whether differences in the level of earnings
and cash flow from operating activities are
large enough to conclude that earnings
management has occurred. The t-test for
mean difference was performed. The year of
the latest full financial year data available in
the issue prospectus, assigned as year zero
(T0) is used as the benchmark. Thus, all data
in the corresponding periods are compared
against data of year zero.  The results are
shown in Table 3 which depicts the test for
earnings management using the latest year
financial report as the benchmark period.
Table 3
Results of Test for Earnings Level and Cash Flow Differences
Periods T0 – T-2 T0 – T-1 T0 – T+1 T0 – T+2
Mean Earnings Level 0.0553 0.0288 0.0553 0.0365 0.0553 0.0520 0.0553 0.0487
t-stat (two tails) 1.572 2.279* 0.321 0.614
Mean Cash Flow Level -0.0031 -0.0163 -0.0031 -0.0630 -0.0031 0.0428 -0.0031 0.0257
t-stat (two tails) -0.899 1.825** -1.135 0.311
*, ** denote significant at 5% and 10% level, respectively. All tests are based on test for mean difference.
Source: Authors calculations
Results shown in Table 3 do not
strongly support the notion that earnings
management has occurred surrounding IPO
years. Earnings level in the year just before
the offering is significantly larger than the
level in the first year after the issue. This
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evidence might be interpreted that mana-
gement exercises more accounting discre-
tion in the period of the most recent from
the IPO date. This feature is supported by
the behaviour of cash flow, although the
level of significance is slightly lower.
As can be seen in Table 3, mean ear-
nings change is higher in the last year (year
T0) prior to offering date compared to year
minus 2 (T-2) and year minus 1 (T-1). Year
minus 1 (T-1) is slightly higher than year
minus 2 (T-2). This evidence could be inter-
preted that earnings levels tend to increase
when the firm is approaching IPO date. In
other words, earnings levels are increasing
from year to year implying that there is a
tendency to inflate reported earnings so to
make earnings are more attractive to pro-
spective investors. The change is significant
only between year zero (T0) and year minus
2 (T-2).
The trend of earnings level during the
pre-IPO periods is in contrast to the post-
IPO periods. In these periods, earnings level
tends to decrease slightly compared to the
last year prior to the IPO date. That is,
earnings level during year plus 1 (T+1) is
lower than year zero (T0) and year plus 2
(T+2) is even lower than year plus 1 (T+1).
Argument to be proposed in response to
this behaviour is that the firms are no longer
able to improve their earnings performance
after the IPO.
To summarize, earnings level tends to
increase approaching the issue year, but it
will decrease after the issue. This indicates
that issuers have been indicated to bring
earnings up prior to the issue. Unfortu-
nately, they are unable to maintain the in-
crease in earnings, leading to steady de-
crease after the issue year.
The behaviour of cash flows from ope-
rations is rather peculiar. They seem to be
different and are not totally in opposite
direction of the earnings level. Cash flows
from operations tend to improving from
year minus 2 (T-2) to year plus 1 (T+1), but it
decreases in year T plus 2 (T+2). When
earnings tend to be positive in the periods
before the offering, cash flows from opera-
tions tend to be negative, but they turn to
positive in the years after the offering.
Combining the behaviour of earnings
and cash flows from operations, we might
suggest that there is intention of the issuers
to manage earnings upward before the
offering (the increase is significant at 5%
level), but they could not manage to do so
after that periods. Cash flows from opera-
tions follow similar pattern but not for the
periods after the offering.
The findings reported in this study are
similar to that of Gumanti (2001, 2003) who
reported low earnings management in the
period before the offering. Similar beha-
viour is evidenced in Gumanti and Swastika
(2005) who examine the operating perfor-
mance of IPO firms. However, it is in
contrast to that of Rahman and Hutagaol
(2007) who found strong evidence of ear-
nings management. This conflicting results
offer further exploration of the pheno-
menon. In other words, the phenomenon is
still contentious. One might argue that the
difference in finding is a result of period of
analysis where the current study employs
data between 2002 and 2005. On the other
hand, Rahman and Hutagaol examine IPO
setting in 1994-2003 which include a period
where Indonesia stock exchange was hit by
economic crisis of 1998-1999. In addition,
the findings reported here are in support of
the study by Warganegara and Indriastari
(2009) which further confirm that Indone-
sian IPO firms do not manage earnings
aggressively in the periods before the offe-
ring.
Cash flows from activities are moving
in the opposite direction compared to ear-
nings performance. This could be interpre-
ted that the issuing firm is trying to
cosmetically show that it has good earnings
history and performance but it forget to
show that the cash flows has performed
poorly. The issuing firm has to be able to
maintain the cash flows performance after
the issue because basically it has received
substantially large amount of funds from
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going public. It seems that the issuing firm
does not utilize the funds in a proper acti-
vity to generate more cash in the periods
after the IPO.
Another possible explanation relating
the findings reported in this study is the
period of analysis. The periods covered in
this study are from 2002 to 2005, i.e., four
years of analysis. One may argue that after
the economic crisis hit Indonesia in 1998, the
economic as well as financial or accounting
of many corporations are not recovering yet.
In particular, year 2002 could be regarded as
the year closely affected by the ongoing low
performance of the corporations. In other
words, there are many corporations that are
not really recovering well from the crisis
making them difficult to perform well. We
might agree that prior to making the firm
public, the owners of the firm have to plan
the action long time ago as going public is
regarded one of the most important stra-
tegic plan of the firm. The firm might not be
able to fully recover from economic crisis so
that managing the earnings performance
would be difficult. As a result, earnings
management practices are not evidenced
during the periods of analysis.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
Because the wealth of the managers is
linked to the IPO prices, this situation
provides incentives for the managers of an
IPO firm to manage earnings in order to
improve their proceeds from selling the
shares. Using a sample of Indonesia 35 IPOs
during the 2002-2005 periods, this study
investigates whether managers of the IPO
firms exercise income-increasing discretio-
nary accruals before IPO by bringing up
reported earnings and cash flows from ope-
ration to maximize the offering prices and
private wealth. Evidence reported here sug-
gests that companies use different discretio-
nary components for earnings management
in the most current year prior to the offe-
ring.
However, given that the difference in
the level of earnings and cash flow is only
significant in the year close to the offering
year, it would be too soon to justify that
earnings management hypothesis has been
strongly evidenced. First, the time series of
earnings and cash flows demonstrates an
upward trend for the pre-IPO period and a
downward trend for the post-IPO period in
particular the earnings level. Although the
observed trend in earnings is consistent
with the earnings management hypothesis,
the upward trend in cash flows suggests
changes in economic situation for the IPO
firms-the existence of real earnings mana-
gement. Further analysis of the time series
in the gap between these two variables sug-
gests that IPO firms enhance earnings
through both real earnings management
and accounting choices.
Some implications of the findings merit
further exploration. This study uses simple
test to examine the possible for earnings
management during the periods surroun-
ding the IPO. It does not control for possible
effect of accruals management as usually
employed in previous studies. Secondly, the
number of sample firms meeting the criteria
to be analysed could also affect the robust-
ness of the findings. However, limiting the
period in year 2002 is expected to avoid for
confounding effect of economic crisis which
was severely hit Indonesian economy in
year 1998 through early 2000 which could in
many respects affect the real performance of
the going public firms. Yet, the effect of
economic crisis could still be inherent in the
firm financial performance given the data
analysed in the study include two years
prior to the year of offering. Further study
may compare the figures for IPO long
before the economic crisis and those after
the crisis, for instance five years after the
crisis. In other words, next study shall avoid
any possibility of confounding effects of the
economic crisis. Future study may also
extent this study by examining the beha-
viour of earnings when the firm is making
seasoned equity offering where the period
of the offering is not too far from the firm’s
initial public offer. The finding of this kind
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of study would bring us to understand
whether earnings management prior to the
initial offering cannot be maintained and
thus the issuers would manage earnings
upward when they want to reissue the
stocks.
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